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Abstract: Ng (2016) lists some modest examples of goals that animal advocates could work
towards. We provide examples of more ambitious animal advocacy strategies that are successful
now, and strategies that researchers can use to engage productively with animal advocates. We
also agree with Ng and some other commentators that animal advocates and researchers should
prioritize the interests of individual wild animals over the preservation of nonsentient entities.
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Ng (2016) makes an important contribution in noting that science should concern itself with
maximizing the well-being of nonhuman animals. While the equivalent concern for humans is
the focus of multiple disciplines (medicine, development economics, etc.), nonhuman animals
are more often viewed as a means to an end, whether it be the general advancement of
knowledge, human concerns, or the preservation of ecosystems. However, as Ng notes, the
neuroanatomical and behavioral evidence supports the common sense perception that a large
variety of nonhuman animals — at least all vertebrates — are capable of feeling, so minimizing
their suffering and maximizing their flourishing is an important goal from a variety of moral
perspectives.
We can consider bigger outcomes in animal advocacy. Some of the other commentators
complain that Ng’s goals were too modest. Several offer criticism specifically of the “welfarist”
approach; Marks (2016), for example, asks, “Need animal advocacy be considered a zero sum
proposition that requires our commitment to only one or the other of animal welfare versus
animal liberation?” He apparently concludes that this is in fact the case, making the remainder
of his commentary an argument against welfarism. From our perspective as activists and
researchers, this distinction makes little, if any, difference in animal advocacy strategy.
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For example, we believe that all the common philosophical positions lead to agreement with
other commentaries (and Ng himself) that Ng’s suggested ways to help animals in low-cost,
tractable ways are too modest and “just a starting position”— we can, and should, be willing to
work towards larger outcomes — as shown by recent successes of animal advocacy groups. For
example, advocates in India spearheaded a four-year ban on sports involving bulls; although the
ban has ended, its enactment suggests that focusing solely on prohibiting the cruelest features
of animal entertainment is an unnecessary restriction on the scope of advocates’ activities and
demands (Muruganandham, 2016).
Similarly, advocates for farmed animals should consider outcomes beyond increased cage sizes
and increased awareness of the health benefits of eating less meat. Indeed, advocacy groups
have had success in diverse methods of challenging the animal agriculture system, including
increasing cage sizes or removing cages altogether, challenging the use of animals whose quality
of life is necessarily low due to genetic factors (as Leadbeater (2016) mentions), increasing the
availability and prominence of plant-based alternatives, and educating the public about the
dangers to animals, humans, and the environment inherent in the continuation of the current
food system (Barclay, 2015; Marshall & Green, 2015; Mohan, 2016; Neilson, 2016).
Our research at Animal Charity Evaluators suggests that projects addressing these outcomes can
be extremely cost-effective. In addition to direct outcomes, such as reducing the number of
animals suffering in animal agriculture and eliminating some of the cruellest practices, we think
interventions like corporate outreach and undercover investigations can facilitate big-picture
achievements such as the eventual abolition of animal agriculture, largely by building the animal
advocacy movement itself and setting animal-friendly precedents in policy and social norms.
Recognizing wild animals as individuals. We agree with Ng’s suggestion that “without ignoring
wild animals altogether, our initial emphasis should be more on farmed animals.” We appreciate
that Johannsen (2016) takes this view further, suggesting that “animal rights theorists should
acknowledge that their position also requires a hypothetical commitment to intervening in the
wild.”
We see animal suffering — especially the most intense forms like confinement, violent death, or
serious illness — as morally horrific, regardless of its cause. This view comes naturally once one
takes the perspective of the wild animal, who indicates in every part of his behavior that he
strongly opposes his natural suffering. This recognition of animals as morally relevant persons
with their own interests also leads to our opposition to human-caused suffering, and it’s the key
reason we take a view different from that of Marks who sees wild animal welfare and
preferences as “beside the point.”
Academia can help animals in a number of ways. Ng offers suggestions as to how animal
welfare advocates can be more effective, focusing primarily on two points which are compelling
from an academic perspective: avoiding hyperbole and promoting technological progress that
would enable us to be more effective in promoting both human and animal welfare. While these
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are good suggestions, on their own they reinforce a limiting view of the interaction between
academics and advocates, one in which academics are restricted to advising advocates on the
intellectual rigor of their approach, while advocates may be informed by academia but cannot
offer reciprocal guidance that would help lead to the production of knowledge which could be
applied to current problems. We feel it is important to recognize the full potential value of
academic research for animal advocates and want to offer some possible strategies for
academics:
Most directly, scholars with expertise or interest in social sciences can provide empirical
evidence to inform tactical decisions. Scholars could enhance advocates’ effectiveness by
empirically testing methods of outreach and social change, and by communicating their
findings to a broad audience of animal advocates. Studies could also be carried out
collaboratively, with scholars providing research expertise and advocacy groups providing
resources that allow scholars to work with large sample sizes in the field. They can also
synthesize social movement information, psychological theories, and other streams of
evidence to provide strategic guidance.
Welfare biologists can also help advocates work in the most effective ways, by identifying
the incremental changes, such as larger cages or less harmful breeding, that would most
benefit animals as we work towards more fundamental improvements.
Legal scholars can work with groups like the Nonhuman Rights Project to enhance and
further the case for appropriate moral consideration of animals in the current legal
framework.
Animal ethicists, other philosophers, and other academics can work to identify arguments or
methods of persuasion that can help others in their field appreciate the moral worth of
animals and give them proper consideration.
We are very excited about further collaboration between advocates and academics. Animal
Charity Evaluators will be hosting a research symposium at Princeton University in November
2016 to facilitate this partnership. We invite interested scholars to join us there.
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